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I.  INTRODUCTION
Constructing  our  information  environment  as  one  composed  of
information  "from  diverse  and  antagonistic  sources"'  has been  a  central
focus of structural regulation and its First Amendment justification for half
a  century.  In  the  twentieth  century,  structural  media  regulation  meant
*  Associate Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1.  Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
tinkering with the configuration  of a mass media market aimed at eyeballs.
For example,  group  ownership  and  duopoly  rules,  licensing  criteria like
diversity  and  localism,  financial  interest  and  syndication  rules,  or  cable
access rules,  took the basic structure of mass media markets  as given,  and
tried  to  make  sure  that  this  basic  structure  delivered  somewhat  more
diverse  content  than  it would if left to  its own devices.  Technology  now
makes possible the  attainment of decentralization  and democratization  by
enabling small  groups  of constituents  and individuals  to become  users-
participants  in  the  production  of  their  information  environment-rather
than by  lightly regulating  concentrated  commercial  mass media  to  make
them better  serve individuals  conceived  as passive  consumers.  Structural
media regulation in the twenty-first century must, in turn, focus on enabling
a wide distribution of the capacity  to produce and disseminate information
as a more effective  and normatively attractive  approach to  serve  the goals
that have traditionally animated structural media regulation.
As  the digitally  networked  environment matures,  regulatory  choices
abound that implicate whether the network will be one of peer users or one
of active producers who serve  a menu of prepackaged information goods to
consumers whose role is limited to selecting from this menu. These choices
occur  at  all  levels  of  the  information  environment:  the  physical
infrastructure  layer-wires,  cable,  radio  frequency  spectrum-the  logical
infrastructure  layer-software-and  the  content  layer.  At  the  physical
infrastructure  level,  we  are  seeing it in  such decisions  as  the  digital TV
orders  (DTV Orders), or the question of open  access  to cable broadband
services,  and  the  stunted  availability  of  license-free  spectrum.  At  the
logical  layer,  we  see  laws  like  the  Digital  Millennium  Copyright  Act
(DMCA)2 and the technology control litigation that has followed hard upon
its heels, as owners  of copyrighted  works  attempt  to lock up the software
layer so as  to permit them to  control all valuable uses of their works.3  At
the content layer, we have  seen an enclosure movement  aimed at enabling
information  vendors  to  capture  all  the  downstream  value  of  their
information.  This  enclosure  raises  the  costs  of becoming  a  user-rather
than  a  consumer-of  information  and  undermines  the  possibility  of
2.  See Pub. L. No.  105-304,  112 Stat. 2860 (1998)  (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.A).
3.  See,  e.g.,  Recording Industry Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc.,  180
F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999)  (permitting manufacture  and sales of Rio, a portable MP3 player,
against recording  industry  challenge);  Universal  City  Studios, Inc.  v. Reimerdes,  No.  00
Civ.  0277  (LAK)  (S.D.N.Y.  Feb.  2,  2000),  available  at  (Mar.  19,  2000)
<http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtweb/pdf/00-01149.PDF>;  DVD  Copy  Control  Ass'n,
Inc. v. McLaughlin, No. CV 786804 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2000), available  at (Mar.  19,
2000)  <http://www.eff.org/iplVideo/DVDCCA-case/20000120-pi-order.html>  (facing
similar issues framed under California trade secret law).
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becoming a producer/user of information  for reasons  other than profit, by
means other than sales.
At all these levels, the fundamental  commitment of our democracy to
secure  "the widest  possible dissemination  of information  from  diverse and
antagonistic  sources,'4  which  has  traditionally  animated  structural  media
regulation,  should  be  on  securing  a  significant  component  of  the
information  environment for creative use by users. To implement such an
agenda would  require  a  focus  on identifying  resources  necessary  for the
production and exchange of information and fashioning regulatory policies
that make  access  to and use of these  resources  equally  and ubiquitously
available to  all users  of the network.  Developing  a series  of commons  in
such  resources  is  an  important  mode  of  implementation  of  this
commitment. Other modes could include access  and carriage requirements
aimed specifically at making possible the development of a network of peer
users.  Identifying  and  sustaining  commons  and  securing  access  to
communicative  resources  are  more  important  focuses  for  information
policy  concerned  with democracy  than assuring that there are  eight rather
than three broadcast networks or that no two networks  are under common
ownership.
II.  AT THE CROSSROADS
The basic structure of mass media markets emerged in the middle of
the nineteenth  century.  Harold  Innis  and  James  Beniger6 have  described
how  the  development  of  high  volume,  high  cost  mechanized  printing
presses  and the telegraph changed the enterprise of the press from a local,
small circulation medium for political and public discourse to a mass scale
demand  management  system. 7  As  Innis put it, journalists  became  people
who  write  on  the  back  of  advertisements.8  After  the  introduction  of
broadcast, a series of business and regulatory decisions channeled this new
4.  Associated Press,  326  U.S.  at 20;  see also Turner Brdcst.  Sys.,  Inc. v. FCC,  520
U.S.  180 (1997); Turner Brdcst.  Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994);  Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976);  Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131,  139-40  (1969);
Red Lion Brdcst.  Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.  367 (1969);  New York Times  v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 266 (1964).
5.  HAROLD INNIs,  THE BIAS OF COMMUNICATION (1951).
6.  JAMES  R.  BENIGER,  THE CONTROL  REVOLUTION:  TECHNOLOGICAL  AND  ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OFTHEINFORMATION  SocIETY  (1986).
7.  Beniger is the one who explained most usefully how advertising in mass media was
introduced to solve the growing gap between the tremendous growth  of productivity  in the
nineteenth  century and  the lagging changes  in demand  patterns. See also ITHIEL DE SOLA
POOL, TECHNOLOGIES  OF FREEDOM  (1984) (describing rise of mass media).
8.  See INNIS, supra note 5, at 186.
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medium into the same model,9 and by the late  1920s, the basic structure of
our mass mediated environment was in place.1 0 This structure relies largely
on a small number of professional, commercial producers  seeking to  serve
the  widest possible audiences.  As  Baker showed  quite comprehensively,"
they  do  so  by  providing  information  and  cultural  products  that  have
relatively  wide appeal  and gloss  over, rather than  tend to, the diversity of
actual  interests  and  needs  of finer  divisions within  the body of the mass
audience.  Nothing captures  this better than the metaphor of the market for
eyeballs. This basic structure will remain unaffected as long as we continue
to  think of our information  and  communications policy purely in terms  of
securing better service to consumers.
There is an alternative. The Internet graphically  represents this for us,
at  least  as  it was in the  1990s.  In  this  information  environment,  the  end
points  are  users-an  ambiguous  category  from  the  perspective  of  an
established  conception  of  an  information  environment  composed  of  (a
small number  of professional)  producers  and  (a  large number  of passive)
consumers.  Users sometimes receive information  and  sometimes rework it
and  send it to  others. They  can play the roles of producer  and consumer.
Their  acts  of reception  are  dialogic  in the  sense  that  they  can  easily  be
mapped  as  moves  in  a  conversation  rather  than  as  endpoints  for  the
delivery of a product.1
This  alternative  is neither utopian  nor preordained.  It is  possible to
have a system that breaks  through the clear cut categories  of producer and
consumer. For decades,  individuals  have been  willing to pay much more
for  the  privilege  of  participating  in  conversations  than  to  receive
professional  content-expenditures  on  long-distance  and  local  telephones
have been greater  than expenditures  on newspapers,  magazines, broadcast,
cable,  and  movies  put together. 3  A  combination  of technology,  business
9.  See GLEASON L. ARCHER,  HISTORY  OF RADIO  TO  1926 (1938);  ERIK  BARNOUW,  A
TowER IN BABEL:  A  HISTORY  OF BROADCASTING  IN THE  UNIrED STATES  (1966);  BENIGER,
supra note 6, 362-70; PHILIP T. ROSEN, THE MODERN STENTORS: RADIO BROADCASTERS  AND
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,  1920-1934 (1980).
10.  See  Yochai  Benkler,  Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the  Commons of the
Digitally  Networked Environment, 11 HARV.  J. L. & TECH. 287, 299-318  (1998).
11.  See  C. Edwin  Baker, Giving the Audience  What It Wants, 58  OHIO  ST.  L.J. 311
(1997).
12.  I have provided a more detailed breakdown of the differences between the broadcast
model  of  communication  and  the  internet  model  in  Yochai  Benkler,  Communications
Infrastructure  Regulation and the Distribution of Control over Content, 22  TELECOMMS.
POL'Y 183  (1998).
13.  That  these  prices  were  inflated  by  monopolies  does  nothing  to  undermine  the
conclusion  that people  were  willing  to  spend much  more  on speaking  than  on  receiving
mass-marketed content.
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organization,  and law prevented  the emergence of a widely  decentralized
information  environment  where  production  and  consumption  are  less
starkly separated.'
4
Today,  as  the  Internet  and  the  digitally  networked  environment
present us with  a new set of regulatory  choices, it is  important to  set our
eyes  on  the  right  prize.  That  prize  is  not the  Great  Shopping  Mall  in
Cyberspace.  That prize is  the Great  Agora-the  unmediated conversation
of the many with the many.
III.  WHY USERS?
DEMOCRACY,  PERSONAL AUTONOMY,  AND COMMUNICATION
In  a series  of cases  in which  the Supreme  Court  reviewed  various
media regulations,  the Court has steadily developed an understanding that
decentralization  of information  production  is  a policy  that  serves values
central  to the First Amendment.15 Most pithily captured in Justice Black's
statement  in  United States v.  Associated Press,  since  adopted  in  other
cases  in this line-Red Lion and the two Turner cases-it is central to the
values  served by the First Amendment that we secure "the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources."' 7
These cases represent a central  problem of modem First Amendment
law. First identified in 1947 by Zechariah Chafee"  and the Commission on
Freedom  of the  Press  (Commission) that  he vice-chaired, 9  the  problem
arises  from the technological  and  economic fact that different people  and
organizations  in society  have very  different power  to affect  the flow  of
information in society. In particular, the owners of mass media outlets have
an unusual degree of control over who gets to say what in the public arena.
The problem arises when government intervenes  to regulate media outlets
with  the  specific  intent  of  serving  the  values  underlying  the  First
Amendment-robust  debate,  diversity  of  viewpoints,  and  individual
expressive  freedom.  The  hope  for  such regulation  is  that it will  in  fact
implement  these  core  values.  The  fear,  of  which  Chafee  and  the
Commission writing at the dawn of the second red scare were well aware,
14.  See Benider, supra note 12; Benkler, supra note 10, at 299-318.
15.  For  a  more complete  review of these cases  and  my conclusions  from  them,  see
Yochai  Benkler,  Free as the  Air to  Common  Use:  First Amendment  Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public  Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 366-86 (1999).
16.  326 U.S. 1 (1945).
17.  1d,  at 20.
18.  See 2 ZEcHARIAH  CHAFES,  JR.,  GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNIcATiONs  471-719
(1947).
19.  THE  COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESs, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 1-12
(1947).
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was  not  only, or even primarily,  that regulators  would do a poor job and
discourage  as much  as  encourage  valuable  speech.2 3  The  problem  is  that
government might use its power to suppress  speech it disagrees with under
the guise of regulating to enhance freedom of speech, and that government
would  get  too  comfortable  with  the  idea  of regulating  communications
markets  and regulate well beyond what is necessary to assure robust, open
discourse.21
The problem of how to reconcile the fear of government intervention
with  the  reality  of  a  tightly  controlled  media  industry  that  provides
relatively  little  diversity  and less  access  to  most of society's  constituents
has  since been taken  up by others. Jerome Barron's work on access rights
was  the high  water  mark of the  direct translation  of these  insights  into a
claim  for  constitutionally  based  access  rights  to  the  means  of  public •22
discourse.  It largely broke on the shoals of Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v.  Tornillo. 23  Since  then,  Baker,24  Fiss,25 and  Sunstein26  have  developed
extensive  and  sophisticated  justifications  for  the  adoption  of  speech-
enhancing policies.
It  is  all  too  simple  and  misleading  to  ignore  the  centrality  of the
electronic  media regulation  cases  to  our understanding  of the values  we
ought to pursue  in our information  and communications  policy.  We have
the imperious tone of Miami Herald  to sooth us into believing that it, rather
than these aberrant cases, is the norm adopted by the First Amendment, and
they  are  the  deviant.  The  media  regulation  cases  themselves  rely  on
technology,  special  market  conditions,  or newness  of the  technology  to
justify  their  positions.  But  at  the  end  of  the  day,  we  are  left  with  a
remarkable  and  robust  state  of affairs.  "Special"  regulatory  regimes  that
look more leniently on carriage regulation  or access requirements  than the
supposedly  normal case,  which has  come to apply primarily  to the printed
page,  cover all electronic carriage media-wireless,  coaxial cable,  twisted
pair, or other telecommunications  media.
20.  See CHAFEE, supra  note  18, at 475-76.
21.  See id. at 476-77.
22.  See JEROME BARRON,  FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF ACCESs TO
MASS  MEDIA  (1973);  Jerome  Barron, Access to the Press-A First  Amendment Right?, 80
HARV. L. REV.  1641  (1967).
23.  418 U.S. 241  (1974).
24.  See C. Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147  U. PA. L. REV. 317  (1998);
Baker, supra note  11,  at 322-44.
25.  See Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV.  L. REv. 781 (1987).
26.  See CASs R. SUNsTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
[Vol. 52YOCHAI BENKLER
The  basic commitment that explains  this "anomaly"  is  most plainly
stated in Red Lion Broadcasting  Co. v. FCC: 
27 "It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will  ultimately prevail,  rather than to countenance  monopolization  of that
market,  whether  it be by  the Government  itself or a private  licensee."'
More  recently,  the  Court  in  Turner Broadcasting System,  Inc.  v.  FCC
(Turner  1)29 reiterated that "[t]he  potential for abuse of this private power
over a central  avenue of communication  cannot be overlooked.  The  First
Amendment's  command  that  government  not  impede  the  freedom  of
speech  does not disable  the government from taking  steps  to  ensure that
private interests  not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway
of communication, the free flow of information and ideas."3°
The  Court sees the first amendment as embodying a commitment to
robust  public  discourse  and  individual  expressive  freedom,  not  as  a
technical  rule against regulation  qua regulation.  As the technological  and
economic  parameters  of mass  media  concentrated,  commercialized,  and
homogenized information production and exchange, the Court accepted  the
potential  necessity of government regulation to counteract these effects  in
service of a more robust and free exchange of ideas. The fear expressed by
Chafee-that  government  could  abuse  benign media  regulation  or  could
simply  get it so wrong  as  to  have  significant deleterious  effects  on  free
speech-has  evolved  into  the  heightened  scrutiny  adopted  in  Turner L
There,  while  accepting  the potential  legitimacy  and importance  of must-
carry  regulation,  the  Court  nonetheless  retained  an  important  role  in
examining this benign legislation precisely to verify that it is in fact benign,
rather than either censorial or seriously ill advised.
In the digitally networked environment,  there is a better way to serve
the  goals  that  have  long  justified  structural  media  regulation.  This
environment could, in principle, be designed on a widely distributed model,
where  individuals  and  small  groups  can  express  themselves,  exchange
views,  and  create  their  own  information  environment  with  a  reach  and
efficacy not possible since the rise of mass media.
The reasons underlying this potential shift in the capacity to produce
the  information  environment  are  the  radical  reduction  in  the  cost  of
processors  and the flat, distributed design  of the Internet.  Together these
mean  that  relatively  cheap  end  points  in  a  network-computers-can
produce  quite  sophisticated  communications,  access  the  Internet,  and
27.  395 U.S. 367 (1969).
28.  Id. at 390.
29.  512 U.S. 622 (1994).
30.  Id. at 657 (citations omitted).
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disseminate them more or less everywhere. Technically, the Internet has no
center to control who gets to say what to whom. Economically, the low cost
of producing and communicating information means that the old points of
concentration-the  presses  and  distribution  systems,  the  broadcast
transmitters  and  licenses,  the cable  systems-no  longer present  the  same
insurmountable  barriers  to entry  to becoming  a speaker  as  they  do in the
mass mediated environment.
On  its  face,  this  suggests  that  the  emergence  of  the  digitally
networked environment would counsel a no-regulation approach. The mass
mediated  environment  is  no  longer  the  sole  source  of  widely  available
information  exchange.  The  alternative-the  digitally  networked
environment-no  longer  suffers from  the same  structural  imbalances  that
traditionally justified regulation. One might imagine that this is the time for
the regulators to rest.
A  closer  look  suggests  something  quite  different.  We  are  making
regulatory  choices  at  all  layers  of  the  information  environment-the
physical  infrastructure,  logical  infrastructure,  and  content  layers-that
threaten to concentrate  the digital environment  as it becomes more central
to  our  social  conversation.  These  include  decisions  about  intellectual
property  law,  which  can  make  ownership  of  content  a  point  of
reconcentration,  decisions  about the design  of software  and  its standards,
and  the  regulation  of  physical  infrastructure  available  to  Internet
communications,  like  cable  broadband  services.  At  all  these  layers,  the
wrong  decisions  could  enable a  reproduction  of the  mass  media model,
with all its shortcomings, in the digitally networked environment. Avoiding
making  these  mistakes  should  be  the  focus  of  the  efforts  we  have
traditionally  focused  on  structural  media  regulation.  An open,  free,  flat,
peer-to-peer  network  best serves  the ability of anyone-individual,  small
group,  or  large  group-to  come  together  to  build  our  information
environment.  It is through such open  and  equal  participation  that we will
best  secure  both  robust  democratic  discourse  and  individual  expressive
freedom.
IV.  REPRODUCTION  OF THE CONSUMER-PRODUCER
RELATIONSHIP AT THE CONTENT LAYER
No case more  starkly represents the concentrating effect of a law that
assumes a producer-consumer  model  than the Los Angeles Times v.  Free
Republic case. 31  In  late  1999,  the  Washington Post and  the Los Angeles
Times  persuaded  a district  court  that  individual  users  could  not cut  and
31.  No.  98-7840  (C.D.  Cal.  Sept.  28,  1998),  available at (visited  Mar.  17,  2000)
<http:lwww.techlawjoumal.comlcourts/freereplDefault.htm>.
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paste stories from their papers onto  a political discussion forum. The Free
Republic  Web  site  is a  gathering  place  for  conservatives  and  offered  a
forum  where  users  could  post  newspaper  stories  with  a  comment,  and
where  others  could then  comment  on the  piece  as  well.  Sometimes,  the
users presented these  stories  as  evidence of the  leftist bias  of the media.
The Free Republic forum presents the alternate universe, in which the end
points  of the information  environment  are  users,  rather  than  consumers.
"Quality"  in this world is not created by higher fidelity or more celebrity
participation. It is  created by shared values  and a sense  of knowing  one's
interlocutors and conversing with them. It is a quality created by a diversity
of viewpoints  as wide and multifarious  as the many users who participate
in this conversation.
The  court  in  the Free Republic, donning its  "intellectual  property"
rather than "public discourse" hat, went out of its  way to characterize  the
Free Republic Web site-which charges no user fees but accepts donations
and  cross-posts  advertisements  from  other  conservative  sites-as  a
commercial use and to deny the quotation of the articles a fair use privilege
under the Copyright Act. The court also rejected the defendants'  arguments
that enjoining them from using the newspaper stories to criticize their bias
put  the  Copyright  Act,  so  interpreted,  in  direct  conflict  with  the  First
Amendment.
The assumption and consequences  of this ruling are illuminating. The
assumption is  that public discourse is best served by increasing incentives
to professional,  commercial  producers  who rely on copyright to sell their
products, even at the expense of individual  users who are thereby prevented
from engaging in public discourse. Such discourse will only be available to
people who have the time to author their own accounts  of the underlying
facts, and the insights of individual nonprofessional critics will be available
only to those willing to go back and forth among multiple sites to get both
the critique  and  the  original  to  which  the critique  may  link  (assuming,
contrary to current trends,  that linking  to a specific  article does not itself
become the subject of some manner of exclusive right). 32
This decision is a quintessential instance of a self-fulfilling perception
of the world.  One starts  with  an  assumption that there  are producers  and
consumers  and that  consumers  are better  off when  producers  have  high
incentives to produce. One then creates a regulatory  system that increases
the incentives  for commercial  production but also  increases  the  costs  of
32.  The relevant case, settled  out of court, is Ticketmaster's  suit against Microsoft for
linking  directly  to  specific  events  available  on  Ticketmaster's  site,  rather  than  to
Ticketmaster's home page where the users could be exposed to all the layers of advertising
before reaching the desired event.
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becoming any  kind of producer, 33  forcing producers  to  try to recoup  these
high entry  costs  by selling to  wide audiences.  This  results  in  a relatively
small  number  of  producers  able  to  fund  full-time  authoring  and  pay
licensing  fees  to  use  existing  information,  who  attempt  to  recover  their
investments  by capturing  wide  audiences.  Opposite  these  producers  is  a
wide, passive  audience  of consumers  constrained to  select  what  they buy
from a narrow,  relatively homogenous  menu of choices  intended  to guess
what  a  large  number  of them  will  select  under  these  conditions.  These
producers,  in turn,  make  up  the  political  lobby  for continuing  the basic
structure  as  it is.  This political  economy  is  responsible  for  an  extensive
enclosure  movement  that has  pushed our intellectual  property law  toward
ever-increasing  centralization,  and  has  squelched  concerns  that  this
galloping propertization is attained at the expense both of innovation and of
robust democratic discourse  that a well-balanced  intellectual property law
could serve.34
V.  REPRODUCTION  OF THE CONSUMER-PRODUCER
RELATIONSHIP  AT THE LOGICAL LAYER
Imagine a ten-year-old girl doing her homework  on the history  of the
Holocaust. Her multimedia paper includes  a clip from Schindler's List, in
which Oscar Schindler looks over the town and sees a little girl, in red, the
only color image  on the screen, walking through the pandemonium. In her
paper, the child superimposes her own face over that of the girl in the film.
The paper is entitled My Grandmother.
33.  One generally understood effect of intellectual property  rights is that they  increase
both expected revenues  and costs for producers because information  is not only an output
but also an input into the information production  process. If a particular use of information
is subject to an exclusive right, then its owner will be able to charge for that use, and others
who wish to make such use as part of their own creative process will incur higher costs. For
a look at how  this effect plays out when one explicitly considers a multiplicity of strategies
of  appropriation,  see  Yochai  Benkler,  Intellectual Property and the  Organization of
Information  Production,  available  at  (visited  Mar.  17,  2000)
<http://www.law.nyu.edu/benklery/lpec.PDF>.
34.  For  a  discussion  of  the  political  economy,  see  Yochai  Benkler,  Constitutional
Bounds of Database  Protection:  The Role of Judicial  Review in the Creation  and Definition
of Private Rights in Information, 15  BERKELEY TECH.  L.J. (forthcoming  April 2000).  See
generally Jessica Litman,  Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REv.  857, 869-79  (1987)  (describing the nature of the  1976 Act's provisions as  a negotiated
settlement among  specific  stakeholders); Pamela Samuelson,  The Copyright Grab, WIRED,
Jan.  1996, at 134,  135; James Boyle, Sold Out, N.Y. TMES, Mar. 31,  1996, at D2; Peter A.
Jaszi,  Goodbye  to  All  That-A  Reluctant  (and  Perhaps Premature) Adieu  to  a
Constitutionally-grounded  Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law,  29  VAND.  J.
TRANSNAT'L  L. 595  (1996)  (describing  industrial policy  concerns trumping public  interest
concerns in legislative process).
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Fade. In New York, California,  and Connecticut, the movie  industry
is persuading courts to shape the evolution of digital technology  so that My
Grandmother will  never  be  written.  In  Universal  Studios,  Inc.  v.
Reimerdes 3 5 the court enjoined the distribution  of the means by which our
protagonist  might cut, paste,  and rework the  snippet, finding them illegal
under  the  DMCA.  That  Act  prohibits  decrypting  code  that  protects
copyrighted  work,  and  prohibits  devices  or  services  that  enable  such
decoding.  The  court held  that the  traditional  "fair  use"  defense-which
would  have protected  our little girl, as  it would  a journalist  or parodist,
from an  old fashioned  copyright suit-does not apply  to the DMCA,  and
that the prohibition on circumventing  the encryption of copyrighted works,
even though it can prevent privileged uses  of works and is not  subject to
fair use, does not violate the First Amendment.
Reimerdes is part of a series  of suits that Hollywood brought against
Web  sites  that  distribute  or  link  to  decryption  software  called  DeCSS.
DeCSS is software that allows users to circumvent the encryption of DVDs
so  as  to  play  them  on  Linux-based  computers.  The  important  thing  to
underscore about this case is that the court found that "even if DeCSS were
intended and usable solely to permit the playing, and not the copying,  of
DVDs  on Linux machines, the playing...  would..,  violate the statute. 3 6
On  this  extremely  expansive  theory,  the DMCA  permits  the  owners  of
copyright to design the logical layer of the distribution media of their work
to  assure  that  their  works  are  perfectly  protected  by  technology,
irrespective of whether  the uses  that users  are  seeking  to make  of these
works are privileged by law.
An  injunction  like  the  one  granted  in  Reimerdes undermines  the
availability of our cultural  commons as a resource for personal expression
and public discourse. In the predigital environment copyright gave owners
some  rights  to  profit  from  their  work,  but  law  and  reality  made  it
impossible  to  track  or  physically  prevent  all  uses  of  "owned"  cultural
products  in  school  papers  or  personal  conversations.  Spielberg  could
charge for all sorts of ways of viewing Schindler  but could not prevent My
Grandmother from  being  made.  This  is  what  made  it  possible  for
commercial  vendors  of cultural products  to coexist with  a vibrant  public
conversation.  Now,  movies  released  in  encrypted  digital  format  can  be
made  impervious  to  this  kind  of creative  recreation,  and  the  recording
industry can peek into college  dorms  to see if kids  are mixing  their own
tapes.
35.  No.  00 Civ. 0277  (LAK)  (S.D.N.Y. Feb.  2, 2000),  available at (visited Mar. 17,
2000) <http:llwww.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtweb/pdfO0-O1  149.PDF>.
36.  Id.  at 9-10 n.14.
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Again,  the  relationship  between  the  assumption  of the  centrality  of
securing incentives for commercial producers  and the consequent design of
the information  environment  is stark. In securing the perfect pay-per-play
environment, this broad interpretation of the DMCA builds the mass media
model  into the very logic of the information  environment and undermines
the capacity  of each  user in this  environment  to  partake  of our common
cultural conversation.
VI.  REPRODUCTION  OF THE CONSUMER-PRODUCER
RELATIONSHIP AT THE PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE LAYER
In  April  1997,  the  FCC  concluded  a  long  regulatory  process  by
allocating  three  hundred  megahertz  of  broadcast  spectrum  for  digital
television  services. 7  Based  on  an  express  commitment  to  preserve  the
broadcast  model  of  communications  for  video  programming,  the  FCC
replicated  in  its  allocation  decision  the  current  market  structure  in
terrestrial television  broadcast. First, each existing broadcaster  received an
allocation for digital television transmission that covers the same market it
serves by analog television transmissions."  Second,  the FCC required that
licensees provide: "free digital video programming service the resolution of
which  is  comparable  to  or better  than  that  of today's  service  and  aired
during the  same time periods  that their  analog channel  is broadcasting."39
Construction  and  "spectrum  recovery"  requirements  in  the DTV  Orders
force  broadcasters  to  construct  the  capabilities  for  digital  television
transmission  within  two  to  five  years  and  anticipate  elimination  of  all
analog  television  broadcasts.  Combined,  the  DTV  Orders require  both
American  households  and licensees  to purchase  expensive  new equipment
optimized to deliver digital wireless transmission in the producer/consumer
broadcast model.
Moreover, as the regulatory process advanced, it became clear that the
six-megahertz  allotments  that  each  broadcaster  would  receive  were  not
necessary  to  permit the  broadcaster  to  transmit  a  high  definition  signal.
Because of the efficiencies  of digital transmission relative to analog, more
information  could be conveyed  over the same bandwidth.  The result was
that even as the FCC was deciding to replicate the current broadcast system
in the digital spectrum, it explicitly understood that this decision meant that
these  same  licensees  could  now  transmit  two  HDTV  programs
37.  See Advanced  TV Sys. and their Impact upon the Existing TV Brdcst. Serv., Fifth
Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R.  12,809,  7 Comm. Reg.  (P & F) 863  (1997)  (collectively
know as the DTV Orders).
38.  See id. at para. 27.
39.  Id. at para. 28.
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simultaneously  or  up  to  five  standard  definition  programs.  The  FCC
nonetheless decided to keep the licenses in the hands of incumbents and not
to split the allocations  so as to permit new licensees. Congress aggravated
the  effect  by  threatening  to  remove  licenses  from  broadcasters  and
networks that dared  suggest they would  rather offer  more programs than
transmit  the  same  number  of  programs  with  more  pixels.40 Concerned,
presumably,  with  public  exposure  of  the  folly  of  granting  incumbent
licensees five  channels  instead of multiplying the number  of licensees by
five, the congressional proponents  of the DTV giveaway made sure that all
recipients of this bounty transmitted high definition programming.
These  decisions  kept the cost of becoming  a broadcaster  artificially
high. First, they required broadcasters to acquire expensive new equipment.
Second, they kept the cost of a license equal to the size of the audience in a
given market divided by the number of analog channels that served it in the
past,  instead of one-fifth that price (which would have been the price had
the number of broadcasts been multiplied by the number of channels  that
can be broadcast over six megahertz in standard definition). At such a high
cost, the cost of entry into the market for broadcasting remains too high to
permit  the emergence  of providers  with  budgets  that  are independent  of
eyeballs captured-like universities or civic organizations.
Three months before it adopted the DTV Orders, the FCC identified a
three hundred  megahertz band of radio frequencies  and permitted devices
capable of high bandwidth, high speed data transmission rates, and capable
of multiplexing-sharing  spectrum without exclusive transmission rights-
to  operate  without  an  individual  license.  This  decision  (U-NIl  Order)"
effectively  created  a  spectrum  commons,  available  as  unowned
infrastructure  for anyone who buys equipment capable of using it. The U-
NII Band would allow individuals and organizations to purchase computers
with radio communications  capabilities and sufficient bandwidth to support
voice and video communications  as well as much higher data transmission
rates than those available from most facilities today (up to twenty megabits
per second).  The technical parameters  necessary to share  spectrum  allow,
40.  See Joel Brinkley,  Under Pressure,  2 Broadcasters  Decide They Will Run HDTV,
N. Y. TIMEs, Sept. 18,  1997, at D1  (describing how broadcasters  like ABC & Sinclair were
forced by Congress to recant their heretical plans to offer multiple programs, including pay-
per-view, over their DTV allocations,  and not to  offer a  single channel  in high  definition
format).
41.  The abbreviation  stands for "Unlicensed-National  Information Infrastructure,"  and
reflects the Commission's  aspiration that the U-NIl  Band could provide a part of the local
infrastructure  for  the  information  infrastructure,  either  replacing  LANs  or  providing  a
potential local loop for community networks.
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almost require, that the U-NII Band be patterned  on the Internet model of
communications.42
The U-NIl Order and the DTV Orders push in diametrically  opposite
directions. The former encourages  the development of an Internet model of
communications for the digitally networked environment if end users invest
hundreds  of  dollars  in  home  equipment  capable  of  operating  in  a
distributed,  high  bandwidth  data-transmission  environment.  The  latter
encourages  development  of  a  broadcast  model  of  communications  for
digitally  encoded  information  if end  users  invest hundreds  of dollars  in
buying  equipment  whose  primary  design  specification  is  that  it  can
passively receive high resolution video images.
The  institutional  choice  to foster  the  deployment  of high  definition
television  as  a  replica  of  the  NTSC  system  is  a  stark  example  of
institutional choices  that can affect information  flow patterns  in society. It
is  by  no  means  the  only  choice  that  could  have  such  effect.  I  have
elsewhere  suggested43 the  similarities of that choice with  the choice  made
in  the Telecommunications  Act  of  199644  to  permit  telephone  company
entry into the video delivery market on an open video system model, rather
than on a common carriage model that the FCC had previously adopted.45
Most prominent in current debates  is the  question of open  access  to
cable broadband facilities. The question has  arisen primarily in the context
of  AT&T's  emergence  as  the  nation's  leading  cable  operator.  AT&T
offered  its  proprietary  cable  internet  service  as  the  only  internet  service
available  for  use  with  its  cable  modems  and  refused  to  permit  any
competing internet service providers (ISPs) to offer service over its system.
This  has  raised  regulatory  concerns  both  at  the  FCC  and  in  local
franchising authorities. 46
The point about cable access needs  to be thought of less with AT&T
in mind, however, than with AOL-Time-Wamer. The point to understand is
that if all consumers  whose  cable  system  is  owned  by AOL  are  offered
broadband Internet access only by AOL, these consumers will end up with
42.  For a more complete discussion of the U-NIl Band and its implications for spectrum
management policy, see Benkler, supra note 10.
43.  See Benkler, supra  note 12.
44.  See 47 U.S.C.  § 549 (Supp.  11I  1997).  Telephone companies who adopt this model
will be rewarded by removal of some regulatory burdens associate with cable operations.
45.  See  Telephone  Co.-Cable  TV  Cross-Ownership  Rules,  Sections  63.54-63.58,
Second Report and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further Notice of
Proposed  Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781 (1992).
46.  An  FCC  Staff  report  summarizes  the  problem  and  cases  relating  to  it.  See
Broadband  Today,  available  at  <http:llwww.fcc.govlBureaus/Cable/Reports/
broadbandtoday.pdf.
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something  that is  more  like  a five hundred  channel  cable  system  than  a
peer-to-peer network  of users.  AOL is a company whose business  model
depends  on  capturing  consumers  who do not know  what "getting  on the
internet"  means,  and then persuading these  consumers  to pay  a premium
for  access  that  is  not  to  the  Internet  primarily  but  to  AOL  proprietary
content. It is immensely  successful  in this  business  model.  With its  new
cable  systems  and Time-Warner  content, it could  design  a system  where
most default choices lead consumers to stay within the AOL-Time-Warner
system, rather than to venture outside of it.
Furthermore,  whether  the "technical  reasons"  that  cable  broadband
services cite are real or imagined, the reality is that there is vast asymmetry
in the information  flows  of these networks.  Designed to carry broadcast-
like signals,  cable systems  offer tremendous  downstream,  to-the-consumer
flows, and narrow upstream flows. These companies, for example, prohibit
users from using their connection to host a server-to become a competing
producer  of information,  as opposed  to merely  its  consumer.47 They  also
prohibit  video streaming for over ten minutes,  which  could  have enabled
small video  producers or local town hall meetings to use this medium as
competing  sources  of  real  time  video  images  of  cultural  products  or
political or other public conversations.
Competing ISPs can compete with an AOL-Time Warner precisely by
offering  users  different types  of capacities  over the  same  system.  These
ISPs  are the primary potential separating  agent between the ownership  of
the carriage medium and control of the content. Two or three or even five
or six such ISPs could replicate  the same business  model as I ascribed to
AOL-Time-Warner,  integrating  with  other  owners  of large inventories  of
proprietary  materials.  But if the number of ISPs competing  in this market
approaches  that of the ISPs offering Internet  access over telephone wires,
then there must develop  a significant market whose role is to enable users
to provide  information,  rather than  merely  to  access  it.  That is  the core
point  at which the  five  hundred  channel model  flips over to  an Internet
model of peer users.
VII.  INTERMEZzO
What we  see  in  looking  at a  series  of regulatory  choices  made  in
various  contexts  is  that choices  that assume  a producer/consumer  model
often  perpetuate  this model  by  regulating  in a  manner that increases  the
47.  See R. H. Lewis, Picking the Right  Data  Superhighway,  N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 11,  1999,
at G1. (surveying broadband services and finding that "The  two leading cable data services,
Time  Warner's  Roadrunner and  @Home,  forbid residential customers  to  run Web  server
computers on the network.").
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costs of becoming  a producer of information. Such  increases  in costs lead
to three effects:
0  Concentration-because  the  cost  of  becoming  a  professional
provider of the type whose activity is facilitated by the regulation creates
an entry barrier.
*  Commercialization-because  of  the  high  cost  providers  must
adopt  a  strategy  that  relies  on  sale  of  their  information  and  cultural
products,  and  it  becomes  more  difficult  to  sustain  production  on  a
noncommercial model
*  Homogenization-because  most producers must be commercial,
their  reasons  to  produce  are  similar,  and  their  need  to  attract  wide
audiences  leads  to  convergence  of the  content  towards  the  mainstream
and the inoffensive.
VIE.  FROM PROPERTY AND FREE/AFFORDABLE RECEPTION TO
COMMONS  AND UBIQUITOUS  ACCESS
Two  policy  goals  should  be  the  operative  midlevel  goals  for
implementing  a commitment  to  enable the  development  of a network  of
peers. The first is  a commitment to identifying  and  sustaining a series  of
commons  in  the resources  necessary  for the production  and exchange  of
information.  The second is  a shift in the focus  of the distributive policies
from  low  cost  or  free  reception-through,  most  obviously,  subsidies  to
over-the-air television-to ubiquitous access  to the facilities necessary for
production and dissemination of information.
In  the preceding  Part,  I  alluded to the  commons  in  two  layers:  the
physical infrastructure and content layer. With the former, the U-NIL and an
expansion  of  the  same  principles  to ultra  wideband  devices  that  would
operate  underneath  many  licensed  services  provide  the obvious  example.
For over half a decade commentators  like Paul Baran, George Gilder, and
most extensively Eli Noam, have suggested that the introduction of spread
spectrum  and  other  multiplexing  techniques  undermine  the  perceived
necessity to ration spectrum by granting either licenses or property rights.48
I have  explained  why,  in combination  with  a robust end user equipment
48.  See  George  Gilder,  The New  Rule of the  Wireless, FORBES,  Mar.  29,  1993;  Eli
Noam,  Spectrum  Auction:  Yesterday's  Heresy,  Today's  Orthodoxy,  Tomorrow's
Anachronism: Taking the Next Step  to  Open Spectrum Access, 41  J.  LAW &  ECON.  765
(1998); Eli Noam, Taking the Next Step Beyond Spectrum Auctions: Open Spectrum Access,
33 IEEE COMM.  MAG.  66 (1995); Paul Baran, Visions of the 21st Century Communications:
Is the Shortage of Radio Spectrum for Broadband  Networks of the Future a Self Made
Problem? Keynote  Talk  Address  at  the  8th  Annual  Conference  on  Next  Generation
Networks (Washington,  D.C. Nov. 9,  1994), available  at <http://www.eff.org/pub/GlNII
Wireless_cellular_radio/falsescarcitybarancngn94.transcript>.
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market,  these technological  developments  enable  a sustainable  shift from
any  form of organizational  clearance-be  it by  a licensee,  an  owner of
spectrum,  or the  clearinghouse  proposed  by  Noam-to  an  Internet-like
system  that  relies  on  end  user  equipment-based  queuing  protocols  to
coordinate  communications.  While such a system may not perfectly  serve
all real-time  communications  with assured quality of service, it could well
offer  an  infrastructure  of  first  and  last  resort  for  many  valuable
communications  that  users  care  about-data  transmission,  including
delayed  video  delivery,  asynchronous  communications,  online  games,
community  (voice and video) chat rooms, or even the ability to participate
in  the local  town  hall  video  conference  with  occasional  low  resolution
blips.
The commons in the air will not supplant licensed services  or wired
services,  but will  offer a fundamental,  universally  available infrastructure
that each user can use for whatever he or she  desires,  subject only to the
etiquette  of  sharing  this  commons.  And  that  is  precisely  the  point  of
securing a commons in  an input necessary for information  production and
exchange.  It is not intended  to  supplant  all other  forms  of creating  and
disseminating  information.  Rather,  it  is  intended  to  offer  a  background
resource available to all as users.
A  robust  public  domain  in  existing  information  and  in  various
creative  uses of copyrighted  or otherwise  exclusively  owned information
similarly is not intended to displace professional commercial production. It
is,  however,  intended  to  assure  that  enough  cultural  raw  material  is
available to nonprofessionals  for reworking,  so that users can  create  their
own collages and expressions of the world and participate in the production
of their own information environment.
At  the logical  layer,  this  requires  self-conscious  policy  choices  to
support the development  of free  software  and  open  source  strategies  for
software development. Most urgently, it means that policy should resist the
efforts  of owners  of copyrighted  materials  to  quash  the development  of
software that gives users the power to manipulate and fit to their own needs
the  cultural  or  information  products  that  they  use.  It  is  of  central
importance  to  reverse  the  attempts  to  use  the  DMCA  to  close  up  the
software layer of the information environment and diminish the possibility
that a robust public  domain will in fact lead to widespread accessibility to
the basic building blocks of participation in our public conversation.
Judicially,  this  would  require  rejection  of technology  control  suits
such as  those described  in the preceding Part. Legislatively,  this reversal
49.  See Benkler, supra note 12, at 299-318.
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should take the form  of introducing  an explicit general fair use exemption
from the anticircumvention provisions  of the DMCA-so users who have a
privilege to use the materials kept under digital lock also have a privilege to
open the lock. It also  requires a privilege for the makers of software  that
enables users  to access  information for the DMCA's antidevice provision.
Just  as  the  makers  of VCRs  are  not  liable  for  manufacturing  machines
capable of illegally  coping  movies as well  as time-shifting broadcasts,  so,
too, makers  of circumvention  facilities  with substantial  noninfringing uses
should be exempt from liability.
Where,  as  in the case of cable-based broadband services,  a commons
cannot be  secured because  the economics of the resource are incompatible
with a sustainable commons, structural policy should focus on access. Once
legislatures  conceive  those whose welfare  they serve as  users, rather than
as consumers,  the relevant focus  of regulation  should shift to enabling  the
widest  possible  range  of  users  to  use  the  resource  for  active
communication, not simply for passive reception.
An example of such a focus  could be the currently  considered public
interest obligations of the DTV licensees.50  Recall that one of the effects of
digitization  is that a six-megahertz  channel can carry up to two HDTV  or
five  standard  definition  television  signals.  These  can  also  be  scrambled,
and  hence offered  on  a pay,  rather than free basis. A user-focused  public
interest obligation  would  not focus  on attempting  to  create  some content
requirements  vague  and  general  enough  to  withstand  First  Amendment
challenge.  A more  appropriate  focus  is the importation  of a concept from
cable-public,  educational,  and  governmental  access  channels-on  one
standard  definition  channel,  coupled  with  a  requirement  to  devote  a
percentage  of fees  collected  from  pay  services,  if any,  to  fund  facilities
available to those individuals and  organizations who take advantage of the
access channels. While this is not a first-best solution as compared to much
wider  distribution  of licenses,  it  is  a better  solution,  given  that the FCC
granted  licenses to  the incumbent broadcasters  in the way that it did, than
requirements  focused  on  quality  of programming.  In  other  words, rather
than  try to guess  what the viewers  want  but do not get  from commercial
broadcasters,  the  regulation  would  structure  part of the  medium to  allow
users to communicate what they consider to be worthwhile communicating
via the medium.
Similarly,  in the question  of broadband  over cable,  the correct  focus
in evaluating  the  AOL-Time-Wamer  merger,  for  example,  should be  on
cable  access-on  the  extent  to  which  the  infrastructure  is  open  to
50.  See Public Interest Obligations  of TV Brdcst. License, Notice of Inquiry, 1999 WL
1211119 (Dec.  15,  1999) (MM Docket No. 99-360).
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competing ISPs to offer service. If the owner of a large content library and
an ISP that aims to keep its consumers within the bounds of its proprietary
services  in order  to market  their eyeballs  to  advertisers  will be  the  sole
gateway to those broadband users who have cable modems, many of them
will remain consumers. Access for competing ISPs would serve in this case
to  introduce  an  element  into  the  broadband  delivery  system  whose
incentives  are  to  enable  users  to  be  users.  This,  in  turn,  is  what  will
facilitate  the  transition  of users  of broadband  Internet  access  over cable
from consumers to users.
IX.  CONCLUSION
The  emergence  of  the  digitally  networked  environment  makes
possible the development of a robust, open social conversation in which all
can participate as peers. This technological  and economic possibility is not,
however,  preordained. Decisions  about the organization  and regulation of
the  content,  logical,  and  physical  layers  of the  Internet  will  determine
whether the digital environment will eventually, in large measure, replicate
the mass media model, or whether it will indeed change the deep  structure
of our information environment. The focus of the policy concerns that have
traditionally justified  structural  media  regulation  should,  at  this time,  be
focused on assuring that the digitally networked environment evolves into a
stable  system  for  peer  users,  rather  than  towards  a  system  in  which
commercial  producers  and  passive  consumers  are  the  primary  players.
These  goals  suggest  that  we  develop  and  sustain  commons,  wherever
possible, in  the  resources  necessary  for the production  and  exchange  of
information, and that we design provisions enabling access to the resources
that cannot be sustained as commons. Such a policy focus would be a more
effective  means  than  traditional  structural  media  regulation  of  securing
robust democratic discourse and individual expressive freedom.
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